

In my father's house': Conceptualising the Pragmatics of Cognitions¹

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Speech Delivered At The Retirement Programme Organised In Honour Of Professor Lekan Oyeleye Of The Department Of English, University Of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria On The 12th Of May, 2021

Introduction

Ladies and gentlemen, this lecture has been designed to be celebratory and exploratory. Its celebratory leg emerges from the instinct to eulogise the heroic service of Professor Albert Lekan Oyeleye, a former Dean of Arts and a former Head of the Department of English whose fatherliness and conviviality are unrivalled in the Department of English. The lecture's exploratory arm is a pursuit of the Oyeleyian father's house concept to launch an entry into a theory tagged "cognition (not cognitive) pragmatics", proposed as a modest celebratory gift to a mentor of inestimable value.

In his inaugural lecture delivered on Thursday, 25 February, 2016, Professor Albert Lekan Oyeleye of the Department of English, University of Ibadan wrapped up his entire academic career output in the phrase, "In my father's house", quoting John 14: 2 of the King James version of the Bible, but using only the first bit of the sentence, as a platform to situate his chair, the linguistics of English, within the non-native context. His adaptation of the biblical text as: "In my father's house, there are many languages", is afforded by two pragmatic factors: the flexibility of the original text and the ways the text's patriarchal metaphor can be synchronised with the Oyeleyian domiciliation metaphor. The following other renditions of the biblical text confirm its pliability:

- a. In my father's house, there are many rooms (NIV, New English Version)
- b. In my father's house are many rooms (New Standard Version, Berean Study Version, New American Standard Bible, Christian Standard Bible)

<https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/contjas.v11i1.6>

¹ This is a slightly modified text of the speech delivered at the retirement programme organised in honour of Professor Lekan Oyeleye of the Department of English, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria on the 12th of May, 2021.

- c. There is more than enough room in my father’s house (*New Living Translation*)
- d. In my father’s house, there are many mansions (*Berean Literal Bible, Douay–Rheims Bible*)
- e. In my father’s house are many mansions (*New King James Version, American Standard Version, English Revised Version, New Heart English Bible, Young’s Literal Translation*)
- f. In my father’s house are many dwelling places (*NASB 1995, 1977, Amplified Bible, Holman Christian Standard Bible*)
- g. There are many lodgings in my father’s house (*Aramaic Bible in Plain English*)
- h. There are many rooms in my father’s house (*Contemporary English Version, Good News Translation, International Standard Version*)
- i. My father’s house has many rooms (*God’s Word Translation*)
- j. In the house of My Father are many rooms (*Literal Standard Version*)
- k. There are many dwelling places in my Father’s house (*NET Bible*)
- l. In my Father’s house, there are many resting–places (*Weymouth New Testament*)
- m. In my Father’s house are many homes (*World English Bible*)

These renditions demonstrate several structural and lexical flexibilities. At the structural level, there are existential items (e.g. “There are”···), movable adverbials (e.g. “In my father’s house”···) and marked subject–predicate elements (“In my Father’s house are···”). At the lexical level, hyponymy (house–mansion; house–rooms; house–lodgings, etc) and synonymy (rooms – dwelling places – lodgings – resting places; house– mansion – homes) are evident. Each structural or lexical choice is a cognitive, goal–driven and recipient design exercise, whereby all users relate to the same reality or event: Jesus talking of heaven where his father, God, dwells and where reservations are made for all humans. A combination, for example, of simplicity (goal design) and an audience

with basic competence in English would readily fetch existential structures with “rooms”, “dwelling places” and “lodgings”, each referring expression picking out referents easily situated in the socio-cognition of the recipient. Relatively complex structures such as movable adverbials and marked subject–predicate forms are connected freely to relatively nebulous lexical items (e.g. “mansion”), motivated by other considerations. One of such considerations is the cognitive or ideological orientation of the word selectors. What is the referent of “house”? What are the referents of “mansions”, “rooms”, “dwelling places”, “resting places”, “home”, etc? How is “house” conceived relative to the invariable “Father” and the hyponymous or synonymous forms? Some of these issues will receive attention shortly.

What is immediately obvious is that Lekan Oyeleye’s choice of the complex version of “my father’s house” complementation is predicated on agency and recipient design: who is making the choice and for whose consumption?

I said earlier on that there is also the synchronisability of the text’s patriarchal metaphor with the Oyeleyian domiciliation. A multiplicity of languages is situated in the “house” owned by “Father”, a figure taken now outside of the Christian religious base of the host metaphor to the geo-linguistic world of Professor Oyeleye’s scholarship: a community of (fathered) humans in which several languages exist. The rider to the “father’s house” bit, “there are many languages” and the main text of the lecture further track the father’s house to a multilingual society where English is spoken in different capacities and for different purposes.

In this research, I adapt the Oyeleyian sense of “my father’s house” thoroughly to a pragmatic axis, using as a springboard the basic cognitive pragmatic content of the structure and lexical preference of biblical authors and translators. I situate words of English in single ‘nature’ cognition of all categories of speakers (native, non-native, educated and uneducated) and locate the processing of their meaning within ‘nurture’, which operationally presupposes nature in the first language speaker sense. I argue that what is said and what is understood may or may not jibe, which does not necessarily imply communicative incompetence on the part of any of the interactants, but rather is a function of either party’s exposure to the language and the degree of influence of the exposure in the environment of cultivation. I conclude that a ‘pragmatics of cognitions’, based on the non-native speaker processing of English words is possible, and that this, of necessity, in large measure, neutralises the concept of lexical errors.

I develop the concept of a ‘cognition pragmatics’ (including its error-neutralising aspect) below. First, I contextualise the pragmatics of my “father’s house” thematically and dialectically. Second, I discuss the variationist meaning concept within a non-native English environment and (very briefly) juxtapose it with the deviationist approach; the variationist slant comes with the cognitive processing that accounts for meaning processing in the non-native setting. Third, I explore the different paradigms of a cognition pragmatics vis-à-vis variant forms. As proposed here, ‘cognition pragmatics’ draws its background conceptual inspiration from the principle of the semantics/pragmatics division of labour, from cognitive pragmatics, from critical discourse analysis and from the theory of epistemic distribution; its main conceptualisation is tapped from the social-linguistic and cultural ecology of the non-native English context. It develops many of its own terminologies, and generates all of its categorisations; in some instances, it takes or adapts some of the terminologies from Mey (2001), Odebunmi (2006; 2016a), Heritage (2012) and Kecskes (2014). I develop the outline in turns below.

In my father’s house, there are many lexical options of equal standing

I conceive of my father’s house in structural consonance with the biblical versions a,b,c, h, i, j and m above and in thematic alignment with Oyeleye (2016). “Mansions”, “dwelling places”, “lodgings” and “resting places” which respectively implicate an independent abode (separate from the father’s house), a place where one lives (not necessarily one made available for ownership), a makeshift abode and a discontinuous facility with deeper religious and ideological implications, may not be in tandem with the current exploration. What is focused on here is the concept of relatively permanent ownership and entitlement offered to one by patriarchal right – a concept common to many African cultures: as a sibling (only in restricted scope, particularly a male one), you have all the rights any other sibling has. “My father’s house” and the clause, “there are many lexical options of equal standing”, thus come with legitimacy, claims of rightful ownership, and personalised claim of possession.

When the metaphor is applied to and realised in English, it picks out a language spoken by the parents in families; it is passed down to children who automatically lay “family” right claim to it either by direct parentage (native setting) or adoption parentage (non-native setting). Thus, the language is available

to all those born in, or adopted into the house/family who have access to its resources and use it at different levels of competence, depending on the amount and quality of exposure (how long and how well the user interacts with the parentage), on the proximity or distality of the inheritance (how close the dialect spoken is to the parentage), and on the individual family member's ability (such as biological endowment for language, self-effort with respect to higher language skills, and attitude to/motivation for language use). However, irrespective of all these factors, all users have a single lexical cognition (which in the present context, I have singled out and separated from grammatical cognition). The same original lexical resources are passed down from the native dialect to a non-native dialect, but because users exist and utilise these resources in different environments, the new setting takes over the original parentage ascendancy and imposes meanings/interpretations that are tuned to the new environment and that synchronise with the sub-cognitions of that new setting. The original sense is retained to some degree in all ecological influencing which means, still, the common claim to family member parentage.

In the current context, focusing exclusively on the lexis of English, I mean by Nigerian English, all forms of adoption parentage lexicon of English found in the variety of English spoken in Nigeria.

Variationist and deviationist Englishes: (verbatim) submissions from Odebunmi 2017b

The term “Englishes” captures, in different dimensions, all dialects of English worldwide. Two perspectives, one wider, the other narrower, are available for the concept of world Englishes. The wider perspective encompasses all global varieties of English, covering both native and non-native dialects; the Englishes spoken in the Americas, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Asia and Africa are subsumed in this class. Bolton (2006) notes that alternative terms such as “world English”, “global English” and “international English” are used by a number of scholars to describe the varieties of English in this perspective. The narrower perspective bifurcates into the English tagged “New Englishes” and what could be called the “Kachruvian approach” (named for the late Braj Kachru). The former is situated mainly in such old British and American colonies as the Caribbean, West Africa, East Africa and Asia. Studies of these forms of English devote attention to national and regional features of language as realised by the speakers of the areas. The Kachruvian perspective trifurcates into three ‘circles’: the ‘Inner’ (countries where English is the “primary language”), Outer (postcolonial countries marked by Anglophone experiences) and Expanding

(countries where English serves as an “international language”). Thus, Kachru’s ‘circles’ provides a more embracing coverage for the study of Englishes.

In their early attempt to study the phenomenon of English outside its native setting, many scholars had conceived of English in the ‘outside’ environment as a deviation rather than a variation. This implied adopting a strict mother tongue-exclusive canon in measuring speaker competence in English. Of note here are Randolph Quirk’s (over time contradictory) positions on the status of English in non-native environments. Quirk had earlier acknowledged the absence of absolute ownership of, or justified claims to, correctness of any dialect or variety of English:

English is not the prerogative or “possession” of the English.... Acknowledging this must – as a corollary – involve our questioning the property of claiming that the English of one area is more “correct” than the English of another. Certainly, we must realise that there is no single “correct” English, and no single standard of correctness.
(1962:17–18)

This position has been adopted and defended also by Halliday, McIntosh and Strevens (1964: 292) with the claim that “English is no longer the possession of the British, or even the Americans but ... exists in an increasingly large number of different varieties”. However, later, Quirk (1985) took a different position, stating that ... “the speakers of different varieties of English will soon become unintelligible to one another” which brought him into engagement with Braj Kachru. Quirk’s frontal attack on what he considered the undermining of the Standard, which peaked with the increasing study and teaching of “varieties”, represented a new position (not to say an underhanded turn) which accords supremacist status to Inner circle English. Kachru’s reply triggered counter-reactions from Quirk and led to heated debates between the two scholars. Kachru (1991) correctly defends and justifies the emergence of world Englishes thus:

- a. It is natural for some speakers of English not to be intelligible to other speakers of the language even in the native contexts
- b. The possible variation in the mother tongue varieties is extendable to the institutionalised or non-institutionalised Outer Circle English (Kachru, 1991).

Kachru's defence is a testimony to the entrenchment of non-native English rooted not in the error analytic approaches which often result in the pitching of the norms of native English against the deviational realisations in non-native English, but in a more solid tradition of a legitimate circumstance-established variety of English, following what, in the current study, we have called the adoption parentage view. The Quirkian approach subsists, to some extent, even in the (relatively) current Nigerian English scholarship, with some privilege accorded the dichotomy between correct and incorrect forms, rather than acknowledging, on the one hand, the more flexible stylistic differences between Nigerian English forms and Standard English forms, and on the other, the existence of one variety of Nigerian English, and (an)other variety(ies). Jowitt (1991) makes some effort to distance himself from such platitudes, but he does not specify the contexts in which any of the forms distinguished are stylistically acceptable. What Kachru was proposing was a set of Englishes raised from the peculiar socio-cultural properties of the non-native environment in which they emerge.

Incidentally, a large percentage of works in the English studies tradition in West Africa, particularly Nigeria, have shown the Nigerian English versions as deviations to the correct Standard English versions. Several aspects of Bamgbose (1985), Awonusi (1985); Adegbija (1989) and a host of others demonstrate this. While Jowitt (1991) smartly attempts to claim the variationist path, its tone betrays a level of deviationist stance. And most of the perspectives expressed in the English clinic projects follow this direction, for example, Awonusi (2015); Fakoya, 2015; Osisanwo, 2015. Clear demonstrations of the variationist position are expressed in Adegbija and Bello (2001), and, Babatunde and Shobomehin (2007) which respectively explore the semantic implications of “ok” and the sociolinguistic dimensions of metaphors in Nigerian English without reverting to comparisons with the common core models. The classifications of Nigerian English, especially by Brosnham (1958) and Banjo (1970 and 1996) present more neutral positions, inasmuch as they offer platforms of competence in terms of speaker range. The same applies to Bamiro (1991) which uses the lectal variational range as a criterion to describe competence in Nigerian English. While Awonusi (1994) attempts an impressive layout of the realisations of British, American and Nigerian English words, his error-based approach places the work with the deviational group. And finally, most of the studies on Nigerian English phonology (e.g. Atoye 2005; Akinjobi 2012) present a cline of approximations of Nigerian English speakers to Standard English.

The variationist approach, which nurtures cognition pragmatics, is upheld in this research. Hence, the position of the present contribution, in particular, only comes in sync in large measure with the Quirkian (1962) view of error-free English with respect to the pragmatics of the lexicon of the language.

Conceptualising (non-native) cognition pragmatics (NNCP) vis-à-vis variant forms²

Cognitive pragmatics and the pragmatics of cognition(s)

When we speak of cognition in connection with pragmatics, there are basically two ways of addressing this connection. First off, we look at the ways cognition is formed and is realised (externalized) in language; this includes the social aspects of language use and acquisition, and focuses on cognition as a *process*. The other aspect deals with cognition as a *product*: whereas the former aspect was concerned with the processes determining the embodiment of cognition in language (and other social practices), when focusing on cognition as a state of mind, a social production, we emphasise the aspect of its use in society, as it concretely unfurls in the several cultures in which the language is used. Taking aim at this product, ‘cognition pragmaticized’, the pragmatics of cognition(s), inquires about its actual use and abuses in society, rather than questioning its development and the conditions determining its current shape and regulatory aspects. Thus, in L2 instruction (and language teaching in general), the focus is on the various uses the product can be subjected to in society. As these pragmatic embodiments of cognition are varying in accordance with the individual societies’ respective structures and uses, it seems reasonable to talk about a *cognition pragmatics* (or a pragmatics of cognition(s), if one agrees that practice uses differ in accordance with societal conditions in general).

Specific areas of study for a pragmatics of cognition comprise:

- a. how languages are shaped in accordance with the needs of a particular society;
- b. how languages are transferred from generation to generation, using the cognitive processes embodied in language itself;

² I deeply appreciate the input of the late Professor Jacob Mey in giving shape to this section.

- c. how languages develop in relation to societal changes and developments (e.g. spelling conventions, style, correctness ideals etc.);
- d. informing the never-ending debate on ‘correctness’ in relation to various Englishes (or variants of other languages, as the case may be);
- e. ending the standing discussion about what is ‘correct’ English and stopping the exclusive honor paid to ‘nativist’ claims;
- f. realising that the pragmatics of different cognitions may retroactively influence those pragmatics, and have us see standard cognitive (linguistic, stylistic, etc.) phenomena such as metaphor and metonymy) in a different light.

NNCP: Conception and Scope

In our conception, cognition pragmatics is a sub-model of the broad cognitive pragmatics. It restricts itself to the existence, generation and sharedness of non-native English linguistics (or the linguistics of the non-native variants of other languages) connected to the general parent lexicon.

By non-native cognition pragmatics (NNCP) in this research, I mean not cognitive pragmatics; rather circularly, “pragmatics of the non-native cognitions”, and conceptually, the pragmatics/context-restrained use of language in the non-native context that accounts for meaning on the basis of users’ common local cognitive contents. Preliminarily, cognitive pragmatics is not a single theory of pragmatics; it is constituted by a group of related theories or conceptual propositions that accounts for language users’ mental processing of meaning vis-à-vis the intention of the interaction. Non-native cognition pragmatics (of English in our case), on the other hand, is intended as a single theory that contextually accounts for the undifferentiated storage of the native English lexical contents and its dialects/varieties in a single mental lexicon of both native and non-native speakers. Detailed differentiation will emerge in the course of fuller development of the theory.

As a point of entry, the theory is built on the key principles of the semantics/pragmatics division of labour: What is X? and What do you mean by X? (Leech 1983). Sustaining the father’s house metaphor in this paper, X can be situated in the family mental lexicon and in the documented Lexicon (lexicography), drawn from the family lexicon. X in our context is restrictively the

parent lexicon shared with adoptees (non-native users) and it captures only the family lexical parentage outside of the variational geo-cultural, sociolectal and idiolectal sharedness. What do you mean by X? is attracted by the deployment of X in slight or complete dissonance to accustomed cognition occasioned by shared mental lexicon. The predisposing factors are the audience, the goal of the communication, the type of communication and the recipient design.

NNCP stands on the pillar that every word creates its own context consequent upon which words used in the non-native settings assume a different colouration from those used in the native setting even though they are in the same mental lexicon of the two users. Consequently, synonyms between the two sub-lexicons are rarely possible because words pick out different contexts and evoke different realities in the cognitions of the two users. Thus, intended meanings between native and non-native users must always be tracked and socio-cognitively negotiated (See Kecskes 2014). This defeats the concept of deviation and insists on negotiated, approximate variants. Take “He is on seat” (adoptee form) versus “He is available in the office” (parent form). The latter’s context differs from the former’s in the sense that being in one’s office in the Nigerian variant is tied to being found in one’s seat, which is not necessarily descriptive of the reality captured in the parent version. The coinage “being on seat” was connected to the observation that most Nigerian workers were stuck to their seats when in the office. Thus, when not found in their seats, they were considered absent from the office. The variant did not consider situations such as being elsewhere within the office. This means that, most times, when we edit our choice from the non-native to the native variant, we alter the cognitive and experiential contents of the original user or use, if we are the original constructors. It is only on a few occasions that isomorphisms between the lexicon works. The popular one is when the adoptee sub-lexicon is an archaic variant of the parent lexicon; “ease myself or ease nature” is an archaic euphemistic form of British English which means to urinate or defecate (<https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/ease-yourself>). Note that in Nigeria, it is more associated with “to urinate”.

Take “Don’t play on my intelligence” and “Don’t take me for a ride”. The item, “play on intelligence” is often corrected in the Nigerian adoptee context as “Don’t take me for a ride”; both are, therefore, regarded as variants. Barring grammaticality issues such as “play with” as against the Nigerian “play on”, which

do not constitute our concern here, the two are not isosemantic or isomorphic. First, all key lexical items are in the mental lexicon of the users: “play”, “intelligence”, “take” and “ride”. The use of “Don’t play on my intelligence” by the adoptee speaker is a structural derivative of “play on something” which English lexicography defines as “to use a feeling, fact or idea to get what you want often in an unfair way” (<https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/play-on-upon>), but its meaning, when collocated with “intelligence” does not perfectly agree with the synonym “to take for a ride”, preferred for it in Nigeria, which English lexicography defines as “to be deceived or cheated” (<https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/to-be-taken-for-a-ride>). This means that replacing “play on my intelligence” with “Take me for a ride” picks out two different realities which do not represent the cognition of the adoptee speaker. One way to determine the inexactitude is to consider a conversation like the one in Example 1:

Example 1:

Ayo: Don’t think you can play on my intelligence

Gloria: Eh? He wants to take you for a ride?

Ayo: Yes?

Sanni: He cheated you?

Ayo: Who said that now? Sanni, you don’t understand English, and you said you just came back from the UK, shame!

Ayo and Gloria rely on their knowledge of varieties of English taught in a typical Nigerian university where the two expressions are synonymous. Sanni, with a parent–variety advantage, seeks to access the reality being described, by stocking the same expressions with a different socio–cognition. Ayo’s K+1 epistemic status (see Heritage 2012) forecloses the negotiation of the cognition which Sanni initiates. If Ayo had allowed the negotiation, what she and Gloria had meant by X: “Play on my intelligence” would have emerged. The actual Nigerian sense of “Don’t play on my intelligence” ranges between “Don’t think you can be smart with me” and “Don’t take me for a fool”, both of which derive from the collective cognition, “Don’t tinker with my brain”. This cognition is approximate to the parent meaning of “Don’t insult my intelligence”, but contextual tracking may provide wider options than does the parent (Standard English) scope.

Pragmaticising variants

Variants are pragmaticised when their meanings rely strictly on the context of their use. As mentioned earlier, the theoretical anchor here is the idea of every word creating its own context in the minds of the user and hearer as well as the co-participant(s). That suggests that the pragmatic meaning of variants occurs when a commonly shared lexical item requires enrichment (Sperber & Wilson 1986) involving recovery of meaning from the common family lexicon and mapping this on to other-cognitions and ecologies which may or may not be shared at the geo-cultural, sociolectal and idiolectal levels. As hinted earlier, recipient design plays a key role here.

The context created by variants and, consequently, the pragmaticisation of the forms take different dimensions ranging from the society-wide to the group and the individual influences. Five dimensions are manifest in the Nigerian adoptee English settings: non-native contexts tinkering with parent norm-provisions, individual, group initiatives, (ideological) group initiatives and context-determined/context-shaped constraints. I take them in turns:

a. The adoptee contexts tinkering with parent norm-provisions

Pragmatic choices tuned to the adoptee contexts emerge from the parent norm-provisions when the prevailing realities dictate communicative directions. Variant choices simply emerge from shared cognitions and the society picks them up. Usually, on account of their consistency with manifest experiences, their simplicity and their relevance to the local circumstances of users, they permeate the society through religions, the media (particularly now through the social media) and other social outlets.

These variant choices accessed here by users through shared cultural and social senses, derive from the following micro contexts: marriage, family, commerce, deference, consanguinity, kinship, food and others. As said earlier, cultural and social absences in the adoptee’s environment give a different pragmatic assignment to certain words. X’s denoting each of these classes of items exists in the parent lexicon, where gaps usually are marked with X’s. They identify at once referents that align with the family cognition and those that do not. This means that when people speak the same language, orientation to linguistic co-belief does not always guarantee the identification of the same referents. Three factors basically account for this: cultural competence, cultural co-belief and social co-belief; they will be discussed below.

i. Cultural competence and co-belief:

Cultural competence captures possessing sufficient knowledge of the adoptee culture to access indexicality in the variationist context. Culturally incompetent persons (such as children of certain ages, children groomed completely in native English, and total cultural outsiders) have no shared cognition to relate to when faced with several variant choices, unless the choices are negotiated. For example, after I returned from a visit to the University of Ibadan zoo with my first daughter when she was three years old (she is now 21), someone jaywalked on my way while I and my daughter were on our way to a family friend's house. I shouted in Yoruba, "A! E wo obo yi" (Just look at this monkey). My daughter asked eagerly, "Where is the monkey". Her disaffiliative response, "No Daddy", when I showed her the man who carelessly crossed the road, indicated her cultural incompetence: she could not map the man on to the monkey as a metaphor of stupidity, a K+1 epistemic status shared by the members of all competent English adoptee families.

In the larger Yoruba cultural context, an utterance like the existentially-structured "There is/no market" compels a more complex attention processing (Kecskes 2014) for the child raised completely in the Western culture (as well as for cultural outsiders) than for a child raised in the Yoruba culture right from the age he or she is able to run errands. For instance, the illogicality of an utterance like "there is no market" which presupposes the physical absence of a market (rather than the simple absence of sales) puts the cultural outsider with a shared parent mental lexicon off balance. The pragmaticisation of "No market" can take a new dimension when coded responses are sent back to a borrowing relation or friend, or to a creditor who is bent on the repayment of a loan for the speaker in the presence or absence of others. Here, the goal of the language user and the recipient design are reciprocally overriding.

The forms below pick out different cognitions from the same mental lexicon of speakers of English, depending on their level of cultural competence:

- a. Wife: A woman married to a man (parent lexicon, PL); a woman married to all men (young and old) in the larger family of the husband (adoptee lexicon AL)
- b. Husband: A man married to a woman (PL); a man married to all women married into his larger family (AL).
- c. Child: A young person parented by a wife and a husband, or parented singly by any man or woman (PL); a young person parented by all adults in the community (AL)

- d. Princess: A daughter of a king (PL); a spiritual principality (AL).

ii. Social co-belief

Interactants’ access to the same social experiences (couched as social co-belief in the present contribution) allows access to the same linguistic forms which mark off these common experiences. Cultural competence or incompetence plays no direct role in the social cognition that produces social co-belief which requires no depth in cultural ideologies but only association, company and short or long term interactive participation.

Often accessed through the shared situational sense, variant choices in this category have national, group or individual appeal. Let us consider four English expressions tracked as being in use in Nigeria: “khaki boys”, “pineapple”, “no market” and “groundnuts”. “Khaki” here suffices as a clue to anyone familiar with the uncommon ground (see Macagno and Capone 2016) of the expression, but here uncommonly collocated with a headword, say “men”, whose presence is marked by its connection to the military in the parent mental and documented lexicon. By contrast, the headword “boys” deflects this normative status to a variant status; for its collocation with khaki to be understood as meaning “soldiers”, “boys” presupposes an interaction with the history of military rule in Nigeria. Without this pragmatic cognition, which should be negotiated, referent assignments are difficult, particularly when soldiers themselves, in the rank and file are referred to as “men”. The cognition that can correctly pick out the designed interpretation would capture contextual tracks such as the slavish obedience of soldiers to their superiors and the soldiers’ extreme subjugation to the sway of the Nigerian military rulers – the kind of influence that can only be established for younger, not older men (here called “boys” even though in the current context, age pegging is not a consideration).

The “Pineapple” is a type of female hair-do, shaped like a pineapple (see Adegija 1989). Its interpretation is best taken from a cognition shared among female subscribers to this hair style and their admirers. It thus constitutes a restricted, macro, gender-based co-belief among female patrons, and represents a cognition circulating only among Nigerians of a particular generation. The argument that such pragmatic meaning stems basically from conceptual meaning in the context as a form of influence from-the-inside-out paradigm (see Kecskes 2014) is explicitly illustrated in the case of “pineapple” where the word meaning crowds out the utterance meaning. Less attention

processing is needed here than that which obtains in a typical cultural co-belief scenario.

In the context of crime and security in Nigeria, the next two items, “(no) market” and “groundnuts”, constitute a micro group of a strictly applied co-belief. In my younger days, there was a place on my street (the place no longer exists) where marijuana was sold. Being an outlawed product, it was not referred to by its original name, nor was it labeled as a particular product. It was called “oja” (translatable literally as “market”) and thus labelled as a product/a ‘good’) which patrons who spoke English could request by using the expression “market”. That way, “market” in “There is no/market” became an argot term whose meaning could only be recovered on the basis of the shared micro cognition of the criminals involved in the trade. Similarly, “groundnuts” captures a shared reference to “bullets”, a cognition prevalent among private local security operators in Nigeria (especially the Vigilante Group of Nigeria) in particular locations in Nigeria. This micro group co-belief works in at least three ways: by keeping criminals out of the loop when organising smooth offensive or defensive anti-vigilante operations; by concealing the professional identities of both the ‘market’ sellers and the private guards and safeguarding them from the law enforcers as most of the sellers are in shady businesses, and many of the guns for which bullets are required are obviously not licensed; and finally, by keeping the security personnel’s identity hidden from public knowledge, as needed for intelligence actions.

b. Individual–group initiatives

Creative individuals or groups (e.g. the media) coin words from the parent mental lexicon which lexicalise the individual cognition of the coiners. The coinage is conditioned by the individuals’ perceptions of realities, and is nurtured by the common adoptee awareness which facilitates access. These pragmatic cognitions exploit a range from cultural co-belief to social co-belief; consequently, the coinage, which is accessible through shared mental, cultural and situational senses, sometimes requires complex attention processing. In most cases, meaning does not proceed in a logical fashion (context–from–inside–out; (Kecskes 2014; Odeunmi 2016), but rather in an exclusively context–from–outside–in mode (Mey 2001; Kecskes 2014; Odeunmi 2016); this somewhat blurs the transition between literalism and (radical) contextualism (see Bianchi 2010).

Let us illustrate our points with two coinages: “a man of timber and caliber” (individual coinage) and “brown envelope” (group coinage). Dr Mbadiwe’s “a man of timbre and caliber” which approximates the parent

mental lexicon “an influential or socially mobile person”, exploits cultural co-belief and social co-belief in the following ways:

- i. It invokes the Yoruba metaphor for ‘huge size’, domiciled in the terms *agano* (mahogany), *iroko* (African teak) and other big trees processed into wood by the *agbegilodo* (the timber workers and their huge timber carrier-trucks);
- ii. It evokes the typical Yoruba joint cognition that is mentally stocked from a social co-belief: the daily sight of gargantuan wood on timber-trucks;
- iii. It pragmatically adapts (see Mey 2001, 2009) the parent mental lexicon, represented in “caliber” and its attendant cognition to the adoptee social co-belief, perceived in the word as connoting excessively high societal positional placement.

Ultimately, the referent identified by “a man of timber and caliber” surpasses the parent lexicon and cognition. The individual is not only identified as one who is influential and socially mobile; he is also characterised relative to the Nigerian socio-(economic) and political asymmetry and skewed social structure which places a huge premium on social influence and elides the rock bottom and the middle class.

The “brown envelope” was a coinage of the Nigerian traditional media during the military regime of General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida. In the parent mental lexicon, words such as “kickback” or “bribe” less explicitly project the adoptee cognition packaged in “brown envelope”. This means that synonymising “bribe” as “envelope” does not pick up the socio-political realities that have nurtured the term. Taking into account the Nigerian political situational knowledge of the Babangida regime and the current trend of the use of the word, particularly its popularity in the political, official and official circles, the (brown) envelope concept embodies the following socially shared understandings, which are not completely co-terminus with related Irish senses of the same phrase:

- a. Politically, monetary gifting camouflaged as a letter or a mail to avert negative media reporting of gargantuan wood on timber-trucks;

- b. Officially, a monetary gift wrapped in a brown, rather than a white envelope, aimed at compromising due process, subverting quality control and entrenching fraud.
- c. In the clerical domain, an envelope, containing a specified, standard amount of money, considered a prerequisite to certain service deliveries.

In a–c above, the scope of “(brown) envelope” is narrower than that of ‘bribe’ or ‘kickback’ which permeates all strata of society. The “(brown) envelope” concept captures high profile bribery or extortion; it, thus, indexes official, not general society-wide corruption.

c. Group (ideological) initiatives

Variants develop from group initiatives which may or may not carry ideological implications. Most often, variants in these categories are associated with religious or social groups. Most non-ideological variants are culturally and socially motivated and, as a consequence, depend on macro or micro-shared local cognitions connected to particular adoptees’ societal tendencies. Two prominent areas in which these connections are found are deference and kinship-imitative verbal behaviours. The two Nigerian English words, daDDY and muMMY are indexical of deference but do not capture any kinship; rather, they locate group non-ideological cognitions that ascribe father-figure and mother-figure qualities to the referents. However, the two variants in the completely unstressed “daddy GO” (General overseer) and “mummy GO”, used in reference to church founders and their wives, do have an ideological loading: that of the superior, leadership group versus the subordinate, followership group. The variant “sister”, realised phonologically as the adoptee sisTER, cognitively located in the religious context, is ideological. Table 1 below shows the different slants:

Table 1: Adoptee variants of “sister”

SN	Adoptee lexicon	Adoptee cognition/referent	Instance	Ideological status
1.	SISter	A woman devoted to apostolic works, including celibacy.	Catholic SISter	Ideological: celibacy vs carnality
2.	Sister	An extremely religious woman	She is a sisTER	Ideological: celectiality vs nominality

“Daddy” and “Mummy”, though phonologically realised as ‘parental’, take on cultural colourations in many homes and social interactions where wives and husbands respectively address their spouses as Daddy and Mummy; the same obtains in larger societal interactions where Christians of all sorts of categories refer to the two in this way. The pragmatic cognitions explored here are located in the largely extreme new version of patriarchal family hierarchy which shifts the superior father–role from the biological father to the husband and the subservient, subordinate mother–role from the biological mother to the wife. The uses equally hijack the labels meant to be used by the spouses’ children in addressing each other. The outcome is often confused cognitions and chaotic referent assignments; yet, that is the pragmatic reality..

The elongated “FA:ther”, used by certain anti–social groups, is often an ideological deployment of an adoptee lexicon to signify the paying of homage, and is accessed through social co–belief and shared situational sense. A revered father–figure is identified whenever the ‘beggar cognition’ is evoked. The referent member of the public, usually anyone in a non–rickety vehicle or any known or (re)knowned public figure, is expected to live up to the appellation by extending a monetary gift to the touts. The adoptee variant is also deployed in anti–social groups to pay obeisance to the leader. Thus, the parent “father” attracts two adoptee cognitions: a mental configuration picking out a source of benevolence, and a configuration picking out a higher–placed criminal (as e.g. an American mafia ‘godfather’). However, in both cases, the social asymmetry of the privileged and the underprivileged is manifest.

d. Context–determined /context shaped constraints

A number of variants are necessitated by context rather than being choices from a speaker’s own mental lexicon. In other words, certain adoptee users, irrespective of their levels of education (high or low), in spite of having access to other forms of particular choices, submit to the contextualised choices of their co–interactants in the common scene of expediency.. Such contexts include being in communication with interactants with limited control of choices, , cultural or ethical restrictions, sequential influences and the pursuit of certain preferred communicative outcomes. Let us take these points briefly in turns.

i. Communicating with users with limited control of choices:

K+1 and K–1 epistemic orientations are meshed into a single goal: to communicate effectively. Thus, where a K+1 user

perceives limited control from a K–1 interactant, they evoke a common scene with a shared cognition.

A: Driver: Oga, me I no see am there. Na Yellow Fever I see
(Boss, I didn't see him there. It's the road warden I saw)

Professor Oyeleye: Talk to the Yellow Fever, my FRIEND.
Talk to the road warden, please!

The driver's choice of "yellow fever" instead of the expected parent form, "traffic warden" is a manifestation of limited control of English lexis, but social co-belief, instrumentalised by shared cognition and joint access to the local isomorphic choice, "yellow fever" facilitates the interaction and provides a pragmatic intervention to attend to the exigency at hand. They actually had missed their way to a social function and needed help.

B: Gardener: Oga sa, you call me now now.

Boss, sir, you just called me

Professor Bamgbose: Wet the flowers now.

Water the flowers now 1

The professor reached for the adoptee variant of "wet the flowers" to connect with the gardener's lexicon and cognition, and consequently get his business done. Choosing the parental "water the flowers" would not only create confusion as it is capable of igniting the wrong cognition in the gardener, it would also delay the activities to be carried out by the gardener who would require explanations and reformulations of the unfamiliar choice of the professor.

ii. Cultural and ethical restrictions:

Sometimes, variants are considered the best choices when considerations for cultural factors such as respect for a complete stranger, an older person's age and ethical restrictions (such as the need for orientation to professional etiquettes or disorientation to taboo) words are obligatory.

Cultural factors

When choices such as the following are made, the user is orienting to cultural co-belief that a stranger's or an older individual's positive and negative face needs should be honoured:

- a. SISTER/sisTER: An unknown woman encountered once-off
- b. sister Bisola: An older woman, whose name is Bisola

- c. Aunty Ayo: An elder daughter, whose name is Ayo
- d. sisTER: An older woman with whom the speaker is close.
- e. BROther: An unknown man encountered once-off
- f. broTHER Akin: An elder son; an older male, whose name is Akin
- g. Bros: An unknown man encountered once off or any male of any age addressed fondly; e.g one’s own son; a respected older friend.

Ethical restrictions: orientation to professional etiquettes: Some job descriptions prescribe strict observances of certain manners. In many Nigerian banks, for example, extreme politeness seems obligatory. That necessitates variant choices such as *Ma* (Madam), *Daddy* (older man), *Mummy* (older woman), *Uncle* (any young male adult), *SISter* (any young female adult), *BROther* (any young male adult) and the indiscriminate use of *sir* (as official identity labels). Some of these sometimes fail in their extreme efforts. The following interaction (between my son, Ola, when he was 11 years old and an Access Bank teller in Ogbomosho, a Nigerian town) is instructive:

Banker: Good morning sir.

Ola: ((Looking on)).

Banker: Good morning sir.

Ola: I am 11.

For Ola, “sir” was supposed to be directed at adults, not a child like him, but for the Access Bank teller, the address term was a routine choice required for her to stay in the job. It was, therefore, a pragmatic choice whose social co-belief failed in Ola’s case because Ola does not possess the cognition evoked for his young age and limited social exposure.

Another dimension to ethical restrictions is the disorientation to taboo words: Choices in this category are made when obscenity is preferred or obligatory and the context cannot afford it, particularly in the presence of children and clerics. An example follows:

Johnny: You are old-fashioned. I have told you too many times, boring there.

Ronke: Daddy and Mummy [a sexual position in which the man stays on top of the woman] is the best at all times

The choice of the adoptee “Daddy and Mummy” was constrained by the presence of two of Johnny and Ronke’s children from whom the couple intended to hide the taboo version of the expression. In this context, the resulting doublespeak worked to fetch the couple the affordance to freely discuss culturally forbidden issues and still somewhat make some sense to their unsuspecting children who were likely to recover Ronke’s utterance as evaluative rather than obscene.

iii. Sequential influences:

Sequential influences occur when a variant choice in a preceding turn or contribution is adopted by the next speaker, usually the one who self-selects, and, occasionally, by the one selected by the current speaker. This may occur as an understanding check, an other–repair or a reformulation device, with consideration for shared cognition. Some examples follow:

a. Understanding check device

Interactants ascertain an orientation to a common cognition to properly interpret choices in interaction in the sequential environment.

Tola: I am off to the car *pa::*

I am off to the bus station

Professor Banjo: *Car park*, Tola?

Tola: Yes, Daddy.

Professor Banjo: Okay.

Tola’s turn with the unclear “*pa::*”, causes Professor Banjo to deploy the understanding check “*car park*” to ascertain what Tola has said. Without shared cognitions (and social co–belief) however, the understanding check will be completely impossible and meaning recovery might be difficult to achieve, particularly because the parental “*bus station*” has little correlation with Tola’s sequential choice. Both Tola and Professor Banjo have access to the adoptee meaning of “*car park*”, and thus jointly orient to the cognition it signifies when selected by Tola.

iv. Pursuit of preferred communicative outcomes

Variants here occur when participants design interactions for the achievement of certain purposes. These may include starting a friendship, discontinuing deference and safeguarding epistemic territories.

Starting a friendship: Constructing familiarity to activate a friendship: Some adoptee choices are made on the basis of shared cognitions, usually in a way that is sensitive to the local contexts of the familiarity interactions, the mutual goal of the interactants (to initiate new friendships or relationships) and the possibility of the interactive ambience to afford the goal.

Dada: You see, things are hard o, Bros.

Toro: Brotherly, na so.

“Bros”, chosen by Dada, is a stylistically broad adoptee form with a pragmatic flexibility to be used in an interaction with a stranger. Its adaptability to informality is mutually salient to the two interactants, thus attracting Toro’s “brotherly”, another pragmatically flexible choice suitable as a response to “Bros” in shared cognition contexts.

Discontinuing deference: Blurring a hitherto existing social asymmetry: Certain adoptee choices, also adapted to informal contexts, come within interactants’ shared cognition as devices to re-contextualise relationships usually from the formal to the informal plane.

Professor Atilola: Tolu, this day is bright; isn’t it.

Tolu (an undergraduate student): How far, Prof!

Professor Atilola: Great.

Tolu’s choice, “how far” is a form found in the communication between peers. Its use here is an effort at properly defining the dating relationship she has with the professor and thus a deletion of the teacher–student asymmetry between them. The cognition evoked with “how far” is demonstrated to be shared with Professor Atilola with the parent choice “great” which is indicative of the acceptability of re-contextualised (dating) relationship to him.

Safeguarding epistemic territories: This occurs when an interactant refuses to collaborate with a co-interactant in terms of providing expected information. The choices made from the adoptee lexical stock are often tracked in the shared cognitions of the interactants, and consequently, jointly contextually oriented to by them.

Undercover Police Officer: This government is silly, Bros.

Dubamo: *I tell you*: my brother.

Undercover Police Officer: Why should anyone arrest Sowore for God's sake?

Dubamo: *I tell you* ((laughs)Bros. Uhm!

Undercover Police Officer: That's right. Smart one here.

“I tell you” is a familiarity indicator combined with the social relationship marker, “my brother” to strategically handle information volunteering as expected by the undercover policeman. His first use of the words seems to confirm the officer's proposition and thus aligns with his position without comments as expected by the officer. His second use of “I tell you” combined with laughter and the more informal “Bros” shows more caution and stronger tightening of epistemic territories contrary to the recipient design of the officer. The officer's final turn, “That's right. Smart one here” confirms his clear orientation to the cognition evoked by Dubamo together with his realisation of Dubamo's correct determination of his undercover role and goal.

Conclusion

In this research, I have adapted the Oyeleyian sense of “my father's house” to pragmatic experimentation. I have argued that there may or may not be correspondence between what is said and what is understood, and that this does not signify communicative incompetence on the part of any of the interactants. I have anchored the differentials to the cognitions activated, themselves located in the parent or adoptee mental lexicons. I have proposed (non-native) cognition pragmatics as a sub-model in cognitive pragmatics theorising for a more representative theoretic entry into meaning explications and negotiations in the non-native settings. The ultimate goal of the larger research is to recommend a co-existence of parent and adoptee lexicons as stylistic and pragmatic variants for the adequate expression of communicator cognitions in the adoptee contexts.

Like any theorizing at the early stage, the concept of cognition pragmatics is still fuzzy. There are many loose ends to tie and several re-conceptualisations to make.

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